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The objective of this study was to investigate three
areas of interaction between pilots and the TCAS II Collision
Avoidance System in order to examine the following areas of
concern: (1) Did pilots maneuver on traffic advisory (TA)
information? (2) Did the pilots' use of the system increase
the miss distance between conflicting aircraft? (3) Would an
alternate design for the resolution advisory (RA) display be
more effective than the current display? The first two
questions were answered with data obtained from a NASA-Ames
simulation using airline crews and a Boeing 727 flight
simulator. Evaluation of these data reveal 14 incidents
where pilots successfully maneuvered their aircraft using TA
information. Forty scenarios where the TCAS II system
directed evasive maneuvers were examined. These results show
that the recommended avoidance maneuvers increased aircraft
miss distance in 37 cases. Alternate designs for the
resolution advisory display were evaluated using military and
civilian pilots reacting to a computer display simulation.
These results demonstrate that a "red and green" RA display
is more effective than the current "red only" RA display.
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The overburdened United States air traffic control system
has failed to prevent a significant number of near mid-air
collisions during the last few years. The increase in air
traffic due to airline deregulation has saturated the current
air traffic control system and has spurred the development of
practical airborne collision avoidance systems. Reference 1
contains a description of the TCAS I, TCAS II, and TCAS III
systems. "TCAS" is an abbreviation for "Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System" (Table of Abbreviations). The
major difference between the three systems, other than cost,
is the amount and type of collision avoidance maneuver
information that is provided to the pilot. The TCAS I system
provides no avoidance maneuver commands, while the TCAS II
system directs evasive maneuvers In the vertical plane only
(climbs and descents). The TCAS III system provides turns in
addition to climbs and descents. The major disadvantage of
all three systems is that the intruder aircraft must be
transponder equipped in order to be tracked by the TCAS
system. Additionally, for a TCAS II or TCAS III equipped
aircraft to receive collision avoidance commands, the
intruder aircraft must have a mode-C (altitude reporting)
transponder.
This report will deal with the TCAS II system and some of
the human factors aspects of its operation. Three questions
dealing with the use of the system by pilots will be
examined.
(1) Did pilots maneuver on traffic advisory (TA)
information?
(2) Did the use of the system increase the miss distance
between conflicting aircraft?
(3) Would an alternate design for the resolution advisory
(RA) display be more effective than the current
display?
To answer the first two questions, information obtained from
a NASA-Ames simulation using airline flight crews and a
Boeing 727 flight simulator was examined and analyzed. A
detailed description of this simulation is contained in
Reference 2. (Note: The author of this report is a co-
author of Reference 2.) The creation of an additional
computer simulation at the NASA-Ames Research Center was
necessary to examine alternate designs for the RA display.
Results from this study are described in Chapter 5 of this
report.
The research in this paper was conducted under the Navy-
NASA Joint Institute of Aeronautics Program. Analysis of the
data was completed using the facilities of the NASA-Ames
Research Center and the Naval Postgraduate School.
II. TCAS II SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
TCAS II is a self-contained system designed to preserve
ATC vertical separation by tracking aircraft, evaluating
collision potential, and displaying advisories and warnings.
[Ref. 3] The warnings include recommended evasive maneuvers
in the vertical plane. The system computes the range,
relative altitude, and bearing of nearby aircraft by
interrogating their transponders and evaluating the replies.
The traffic's relative altitude and position information is
displayed by color coded symbols on a traffic advisory, (TA)
display (Figure 1). Display characteristics differ among the
airlines. The traffic advisory display covers an area at
least six NM ahead of the aircraft to three NM behind the
aircraft. Intruder aircraft are colored amber unless they
pose a collision threat within 20 to 30 seconds. If the
intruder aircraft is determined to be a threat, the TCAS
computer changes the color of the symbol to red, and
activates warning tones, a warning voice, and red lights on
the glareshield. These warnings direct the pilot's attention
to the resolution advisory (RA) display which displays
recommended evasive action (Figure 1). The RA display is an
IVSI (Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator) which has been
modified with red "eyebrow" lights around the circumference





















increase separation distance. The warning lights will
extinguish, and a voice will state "clear of conflict" when
the collision threat no longer exists. Installation of the
system requires the addition of an antenna on top of the
fuselage, a computer unit (black box) and a mode-S
transponder [Ref. 3]. If two conflicting aircraft are
equipped with the TCAS II system, collision avoidance
maneuvers will be coordinated automatically by their
respective TCAS computer units through the mode-S transponder
data link.
III. MANEUVERS BASED ON THE TRAFFIC ADVISORY DISPLAY
A. INTRODUCTION
The TCAS II traffic advisory (TA) display is designed to
aid pilots in establishing visual contact with conflicting
traffic. It may also be used to observe the flight paths of
nearby traffic and monitor the relative altitude differences
between the TCAS aircraft and other aircraft in the vicinity.
This information allows the pilots to see dangerous
situations developing and prepare for possible evasive
maneuvers. Eight airline flight crews participated in the
NASA-Ames study of TCAS II systems using this display as well
as the resolution advisory (RA) display. [Ref. 2] They were
thoroughly briefed that the traffic advisory display provided
traffic information only and should not be used for evasive
maneuvering. Additionally, the RA display was to be used
only for evasive maneuvers in the vertical plane following a
resolution advisory. In general, the pilots adhered to these
guidelines. There were 14 incidents where the pilots used
their own experience and judgment to maneuver the aircraft
based on the traffic advisory information. Each of these
incidents is examined In this report.
B. PROCEDURES
The use of the information obtained from the traffic
advisory display for maneuvering was investigated using
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information from three different sources.
(1) Computer printouts of the TCAS equipped aircraft's
data for all occurrences of a turn or bank, angle
greater than ten degrees were examined for the time
period from two minutes before a traffic alert through
the end of the alert. Similar printouts for the
resolution alerts were investigated using the same
parameters. All incidents of altitude deviations of
100 feet or greater, or vertical velocity changes of
greater than 600 feet per minute, were also examined
for the TCAS aircraft before and during the traffic
alert time periods.
(2) Two observers monitored the flight crew's actions
during the simulator testing. Both individuals
completed forms which contained the conditions
for each alert as well as comments on their
personal observations. The corrective RA
analysis forms completed by the researchers during
post-flight data reduction provided additional
information.
(3) Cockpit video tapes were used to observe the flight
crew's responses to the traffic advisory information
and to confirm the incidents of maneuvering based
entirely upon this information.
All maneuvers which were based on visual sightings were
not considered a misuse of the system, unless the pilots made
evasive maneuvers using traffic advisory information after
visual contact was subsequently lost. Maneuvers based on ATC
clearances or navigation maneuvers also were not considered.
C. RESULTS
The 14 Incidents of maneuvering based on information
obtained from the traffic advisory display are described
below for all eight airline flight crews. Each crew's
incidents will be grouped together to show trends.
CREN «3111: No incidents
CREV #3221: 2 altitude adjustments and 2 turns.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 07:51:00; visual contact initially
gained then lost during maneuvering; twilight; visual
meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew adjusted their descent rate during the
approach in response to a traffic advisory showing traffic
beneath them. After clearing the traffic, they continued
their approach.
(2) CONDITIONS: time = 09:06:49; no visual contact;
twilight; visual meteorological conditions; climbing.
NARRATIVE: The crew turned to avoid a mode A aircraft during
the initial climb after takeoff. Aircraft that are mode A
transponder equipped do not have altitude reporting
capability, and thus appear on the traffic advisory display
without relative altitude information. Additionally, no
resolution alerts or recommended evasive maneuvers can be
issued for these types of aircraft. The crew discussed the
incident and decided that the turn was necessary to ensure
separation since the altitude of the other aircraft was
unknown.
(3) CONDITIONS: time = 09:53:48; no visual contact;
twilight; visual meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was descending to an assigned altitude
of 5000 feet. After evaluating the information on the
traffic advisory display, they leveled off slightly above
their assigned altitude and began a slow climb. A
resolution advisory calling for a climb was issued a few
seconds after the climb was initiated by the flight crew.
After clearing the traffic, the crew descended to their
assigned altitude.
(4) CONDITIONS: time = 09:58:35; no visual contact;
twilight; visual meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew turned to clear mode A traffic on a
localizer approach using information obtained from the
traffic advisory display. After clearing the traffic, they
completed the approach.
CREH «3312: 1 altitude adjustment.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 07:47:33; no visual contact; night;
visual meteorological conditions; descending.
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NARRATIVE: During a descent, the crew responded to the
information on the traffic advisory display which showed an
aircraft 1000 feet below them. The crew decided to level the
aircraft above their assigned altitude. This resulted in the
crew having to notify ATC that they would not be able to meet
a crossing altitude clearance. After clearing the traffic,
they continued their descent.
CREM #3422: 1 turn and 1 altitude adjustment.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 03:53:52; visual contact initially
gained then lost; night; visual meteorological conditions;
level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew gained visual contact on a conflicting
aircraft, but subsequently lost sight of the traffic. The
traffic advisory display showed the traffic slightly to the
right of the nose of their aircraft and climbing below them.
A resolution alert advised the crew to "descend to cross" in
order to pass under the conflicting aircraft. The pilot in
command decided to descend as instructed and turn left
slightly to increase the separation distance. Visual contact
was regained after the evasive maneuver.
(2) CONDITIONS: time = 09:17:15; no visual contact; night;
visual meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was descending for an approach with
multiple aircraft in the area when they received a traffic
advisory on an aircraft climbing below their aircraft. The
pilot in command anticipated the possibility of a collision
and advanced the power on the engines to level off. Uhen the
pilot maneuvered, the TCAS system issued a resolution alert
and gave the crew a "climb" command. The pilot followed the
instructions, remained clear of the other aircraft, and
finally resumed his approach.
CREW #4111: 1 altitude adjustment.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 02:27:24; visual contact after the
maneuver; twilight; visual meteorological conditions;
descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was descending for an approach when they
received a traffic advisory indicating that they were
descending toward another aircraft at a lower altitude.
Using this information, they arrested their descent rate and
attempted to notify ATC of the situation. Visual contact was
finally established with the conflicting aircraft, and the
crew maintained their altitude until the other aircraft
passed beneath them.
CREU #4221: 3 altitude adjustments.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 04:35:50; no visual contact;
twilight; visual meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was descending for an approach when the
traffic advisory display Indicated a conflicting aircraft
directly ahead. The crew evaluated the range and altitude
several times before deciding to level off while the aircraft
was still four miles away. They continued to examine the
traffic advisory information and decided that the conflicting
aircraft was flying in the same direction. A decision was
then made to "sneak under" the other aircraft. They
continued their descent behind the conflicting traffic and
completed the approach. It should be noted that this crew
never received a resolution alert due to their maneuvering on
the traffic advisory display information.
(2) CONDITIONS: time - 06:30:00; no visual contact;
twilight; visual meteorological conditions; level flight.
NARRATIVE: ATC cleared the crew to descend. The crew
hesitated due to traffic on the traffic advisory display and
asked ATC for clearance to remain level. ATC reiterated that
they were cleared to descend. The crew complied by
"descending quickly" to stay clear of traffic. During the
descent, a resolution alert calling for a descent was
received by the crew. This crew monitored the traffic
advisory display during maneuvering and wanted to continue
the descent after the resolution alert in order to increase
the altitude separation between the two aircraft. They
decided against this alternative after a short discussion of
their ATC clearance and terrain clearance considerations.
The crew maintained their assigned level off altitude until
clear of the traffic.
(3) CONDITIONS: time = 06:33:40; visual contact then lost
visual contact; twilight; visual meteorological conditions;
descending.
NARRATIVE: On a localizer approach, the crew initially
established visual contact on the conflicting traffic. After
subsequently losing sight of the traffic, the crew became
concerned with the other aircraft's position and used the
traffic advisory display information to stay "a little
higher" than the other aircraft until they were clear. They
adjusted their descent rate to maintain vertical separation.
One pilot from this crew stated "We are really trusting an
instrument alot".
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CREW #4312: 1 turn.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 01:25:24; no visual contact; night;
visual meteorological conditions; climbing.
NARRATIVE: The crew was climbing after takeoff. They
responded to a traffic advisory on the display by delaying a
required turn until clear of the traffic. The pilot did not
begin the turn until the other pilot informed him that the
traffic on the display was no longer a threat.
CREW #4422: 1 turn and 1 altitude adjustment.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 03:20:06; no visual contact; night;
instrument meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: While descending in IMC conditions, the crew
responded to a traffic advisory by turning "hard left" to
avoid a mode A aircraft. The pilot in command justified the
turn by concluding that since TCAS resolution alerts and
evasive maneuvers are not available for mode A traffic, he
had to maneuver to ensure safe separation. The other pilot
responded that the aircraft was probably in VMC conditions
below the clouds. After clearing the traffic, the crew
returned to course.
(2) CONDITIONS: time = 10:26:30; visual contact after the
maneuver; night; visual meteorological conditions;
descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was cleared to descend by ATC.
Approaching the assigned altitude, the crew received a
traffic alert showing an aircraft 200 feet below them. They
decided to level off and advanced power on the engines.
During the level off maneuver, a resolution alert occurred
calling for a descent. The crew complied with the command
and descended. During the descent, they obtained visual
contact while passing under the other aircraft.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Several patterns emerged from an analysis of these 14
incidents. Altitude adjustments accounted for 64% of the
maneuvers (9 out of 14). The majority of the maneuvers
occurred during descents (10 out of 14). Three of the turns
involved maneuvers to avoid a mode A transponder equipped
II
aircraft. The most common scenario involved the TCAS
aircraft descending toward another aircraft at a lower
altitude. In each situation, the TCAS system provided the
pilots ample warning for the crew to observe the dangerous
situation developing on the traffic advisory display and take
corrective action. The response maneuver usually resulted in
a decrease in the rate of descent or a level off above the
assigned altitude for a short period of time. All 14 of the
maneuvers based on TA information caused small deviations
from ATC clearances for short time periods. Each crew
attempted to notify ATC of the deviations that were required
as soon as workload permitted.
Pilot training programs will need to be implemented to
standardize the use of the TCAS II system. The
responsibility for safety of flight rests with the pilot in
command. Aircrew training must emphasize this responsibility
and allow the pilot to use all the information available to
maintain a safe distance from other aircraft. However,
abrupt turns away from mode A transponder equipped aircraft
should be discouraged. The inaccuracy of the bearing and
altitude information provided by the current traffic advisory
display must be emphasized. The possibility of degrading the
performance of the TCAS computer's evasive maneuver commands
by maneuvering on the traffic display should also be
discussed. The first altitude adjustment by Crew 4221
demonstrates how unauthorized maneuvers can degrade TCAS
12
system performance. Although pilots should be trained to use
the system the way the designers intended, they also must
remember to exercise their training, judgment, and
experience to evaluate situations and take appropriate
action to ensure safety of flight.
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IV. MANEUVERS BASED ON RESOLUTION ALERTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The TCAS II resolution advisory (RA) display is a
modified instantaneous vertical speed indicator (IVSI). The
display consists of a pointer showing the aircraft's vertical
speed and an arc of red "eyebrow" lights around the scale.
This display is the primary instrument used in performing
TCAS collision avoidance maneuvers. The pilot is warned of a
potential mid-air collision 20 to 30 seconds prior to the
closest point of approach (CPA) of a conflicting aircraft.
[Ref. 3] The warning consists of an aural tone and a
red warning light on the glareshield. These warnings direct
the pilot's attention to the resolution advisory display
(modified IVSI). The red "eyebrow" lights on the instrument
will illuminate directing the pilot to modify the aircraft's
vertical speed to "keep the IVSI needle out of the red".
Simultaneously, a computer generated voice will suggest a
course of action to the flight crew. The voice commands
currently available are: "climb"; "climb to cross"; "adjust
vertical speed"; "descend"; "descend to cross"; "clear of
conflict"; and "unable to command". These commands are given
assuming the pilot does not have visual contact with the
conflicting aircraft. If visual contact with the other
aircraft is gained, the crew may elect to maneuver using
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their own judgment to avoid the conflicting traffic. Flight
crew response depends on the prior training they have
received. There are two types of resolution advisories
issued. A preventive resolution advisory requires no
immediate action but warns the crew not to climb, descend, or
adjust vertical speed due to nearby traffic. A corrective
resolution advisory directs the pilot to alter the vertical
speed of the aircraft to ensure safe separation from nearby
traffic in the vertical plane. The goal of the TCAS II
system is to produce a safe vertical separation between
aircraft by signaling for a smooth, controlled adjustment of
the TCAS aircraft's vertical speed until clear of the
conflicting traffic.
This report examines the effectiveness of the TCAS II
resolution advisory display for 40 scenarios. The scenarios
consist of crews using various versions of the TCAS II system
while flying a Boeing 727 simulator in a simulated air
traffic environment at the NASA-Ames Research Center. Only
corrective resolution advisories are examined in this
report.
B. PROCEDURES
An airborne collision avoidance system is only effective
if the flight crews using the system are adequately trained
to use the system to increase the vertical separation between
aircraft. An increase in vertical separation also results in
an increase in slant range (i.e. miss distance) at the
15
closest point of approach (CPA) between the TCAS equipped
aircraft and the conflicting traffic. In order to determine
the effectiveness of pilot responses to resolution alerts,
12 airline crews flew short routes in a simulated air traffic
environment with numerous traffic conflicts. Forty scenarios
were examined where the crews were required to perform
evasive maneuvers based on TCAS warnings on the resolution
advisory display. For each scenario, the following
parameters were computed and examined:
(1) The amount of time between the traffic advisory (TA)
and the closest point of approach (CPA) between the
TCAS equipped aircraft and the conflicting aircraft.
(2) The amount of time between the resolution alert (RA)
and the CPA for the two aircraft.
(3) The amount of time between the TA and RA. This is
the amount of time the crew had to examine the
potential conflict and prepare for the evasive
maneuver
.
(4) The vertical separation between the two aircraft at
CPA after performing the collision avoidance maneuver.
(5) The slant range (miss distance) between the two
aircraft at CPA after performing the recommended
evasive maneuver.
These results were obtained using computer records which
contained raw data on the following parameters: RA and TA on
and off times; latitude and longitude readouts for both the
TCAS aircraft and the conflicting aircraft; and altitude
readouts for both aircraft. A computer program named
"LLTCAS" was written to evaluate these raw data and is listed
in Appendix A. Additional records detailing the scenarios
included observer records and resolution advisory analysis
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forms. Video tapes of the flight station of the Boeing 727
simulator were viewed to determine Air Traffic Control (ATC)
clearance requirements, required level off altitudes, and
flight crew responses.
In addition to the five results listed above, additional
computations were made to determine the flight path the
aircraft would have flown if it were not TCAS equipped. This
flight path was based on the assumption that the crew did not
obtain a visual sighting of the conflicting aircraft and
subsequently maneuver to avoid it. Additional assumptions
included the following: the crew would fly the same track,
over the ground; the crew would comply with all required ATC
turns and navigation turns; and the crew would comply with
all level off restrictions required by ATC. These
assumptions are considered reasonable since the TCAS II
system directs evasive maneuvers in the vertical plane only,
and the altitude of the TCAS aircraft during each scenario is
of primary concern. For each scenario, the altitude of the
TCAS aircraft was modified in the LLTCAS program to account
for the descent or climb rate in progress before the evasive
maneuver occurred. The TCAS aircraft's vertical rate was
calculated beginning five seconds prior to the resolution
alert. The program accounted for level off clearances and
maneuvers that occurred on the traffic advisory display
information. The TCAS aircraft altitudes were incrementally
calculated, beginning one second after the RA occurred,
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until CPA or a level off altitude was reached. The same five
results that were listed previously for the TCAS maneuver
were then determined for the case where no TCAS maneuver was
performed. The differences between the vertical separation
and slant range at CPA were compared for the TCAS maneuver
case and the no maneuver case.
Several corrective resolution alerts in the NASA-Ames
study could not be examined due to a problem with the data
files containing the conflicting aircraft's position and
altitude information. The system could only record data on
two aircraft at one time.
C. RESULTS
The computer output from the LLTCAS program is contained
in Appendix B. It shows the results of 40 scenarios where
evasive maneuvers were performed by flight crews in response
to TCAS corrective resolution alerts. For each scenario^ two
lists of CPA times, ranges, slant ranges, and altitude
separations between the TCAS equipped aircraft and
conflicting aircraft are presented. The first section of
data for each scenario shows the results that would have
occurred if the TCAS system had not warned the pilot to
maneuver, and the crew had continued to comply with their ATC
clearance. The second section of data for each scenario
presents the actual results obtained by performing the
collision avoidance maneuvers in the vertical plane.
18
A summary of the data for the 40 scenarios is contained
in Appendix C. It lists the following information for each
scenario: the time interval between the traffic alert (TA)
and CPA; the time interval between the resolution alert (RA)
and CPA; the time interval between the TA and RA; the
altitude difference between the TCAS aircraft and the
conflicting aircraft at CPA; the altitude difference at CPA
between the two aircraft that would have occurred assuming
the TCAS collision avoidance maneuver had not been performed
(no TCAS maneuver case); the altitude separation difference
between the TCAS maneuver and no TCAS maneuver scenarios; and
the slant range difference between the TCAS maneuver and no
TCAS maneuver scenarios. The data from the summary are
plotted in Figures 2 through 13.
Figures 2 and 3 show the time interval between the
issuance of a traffic advisory (TA) to the crew and time of
CPA of the two aircraft. This interval represents the amount
of time available for the crew to evaluate the situation and
react appropriately if a RA display had not been installed.
Several crews in the study were able to predict the
occurrence of some of the resolution alerts by observing
potential collision situations developing on the traffic
advisory display. The average time interval between the TA
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Figures 4 and 5 show the time interval between the
issuance of a resolution alert (RA) to the crew and the time
of CPA of the two aircraft. This interval represents the
amount of time available for the crew to interpret the
information on the RA display and react by maneuvering the
aircraft prior to CPA. The average time interval was 23.03
seconds with a sample standard deviation of 10.96.
Figures 6 and 7 depict the time interval between the
issuance of the TA and the RA . This is the amount of time
the crew had to evaluate the situation developing on the
traffic advisory display (if installed) and prepare to
execute the evasive maneuver. The average time interval was
16.23 seconds with a sample standard deviation of 6.24.
Figures 8 and 9 show the altitude separation between the
two aircraft at CPA for the cases where a TCAS maneuver was
performed and for the cases where it was assumed that no TCAS
maneuver was performed. Of the 40 scenarios examined, 37
showed an increase in altitude separation at CPA as a result
of the TCAS maneuver. The three scenarios that showed less
altitude separation due to the TCAS maneuvers are scenarios
3, 11 and 23. All three of these cases are similar and will
be analyzed thoroughly in the "CONCLUSIONS" section of this
chapter
.
Figures 10 and 11 show the altitude separation change
resulting from the TCAS maneuver. The differences were
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separation at CPA from the results obtained by performing the
evasive maneuver. Of the 40 scenarios examined, 37 showed a
positive change in the altitude separation at CPA as a result
of the TCAS maneuver. The three scenarios that showed
negative values due to the TCAS maneuvers are the same three
scenarios mentioned above. The TCAS maneuver resulted in an
average increase in altitude separation of 577.9 feet.
Figures 12 and 13 show the slant range change caused by
performing the TCAS maneuver. The differences were computed
by subtracting the value of the no TCAS maneuver slant range
at CPA from the value obtained for the evasive maneuver. As
in the other figures, 37 scenarios demonstrated a positive
change in the slant range at CPA as a result of the TCAS
maneuver. The same three scenarios (3, 11, 23) showed
negative values. The average increase in the slant range
resulting from a TCAS maneuver was 187.50 feet.
The 40 scenarios used in this study will be described
briefly below. The 12 airline crews who participated in the
study flew similar routes and encountered similar air
traffic conditions. Eight of the 12 crews flew with fully
operational TCAS II systems which had both a traffic
advisory display and a resolution advisory display. The
other four crews (2111, 2221, 2312, and 2412) used a degraded
system without a traffic advisory display.
31
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SCENARIO «1 - CREW «2111:
CONDITIONS: time = 00:40:12; altitude = 1996 feet (FT);
descending; descent rate = -4.33 feet per second (FPS) or
-259 feet per minute (FPM).
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command requiring
an increase in descent rate. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (389 FT, 327
FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -259 FPM.
SCENARIO «2 - CREW «2111:
CONDITIONS: time = 10:20:43; altitude = 10145 FT; level
flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (883 FT, 648 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining
level flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO «3 - CREW #2221:
CONDITIONS: time = 03:52:13; altitude = 33075 FT; level
flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend to cross" command to
avoid an intruder aircraft (call sign "FOG 26") which was
climbing underneath the TCAS aircraft. The CPA occurred five
seconds after the command was given. The maneuver resulted
in a decrease in altitude separation and slant range (-24.5
FT, -2.2 FT) at CPA compared to continuing level at the
assigned altitude. This is the first of three similar
incidents involving FOG 26 that is being studied to determine
the cause of these undesirable results. The slant range at
CPA in this case was 11458 FT (1.9 NM).
SCENARIO «4 - CREH «2221:
CONDITIONS: time = 04: 14; 12; altitude = 12093 FT;
descending; descent rate = -32.53 FPS or -1951.8 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command which required a level off. The maneuver resulted in
an increase in altitude separation and slant range (1009 FT,
118 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -1951
FPM.
34
SCENARIO »5 - CREH «2221:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:19:46; altitude = 11070 FT; leveling
at 11000 FT.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (344 FT, 89 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining
level flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO «6 - CREH #2221:
CONDITIONS: time = 09:51:35; altitude = 5228 FT; descending;
descent rate = -10.15 FPS or -609 FPM; clearance = "descend
and maintain 5000 FT".
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (550 FT, 31 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the
descent at -609 FPM to a level off altitude of 5000 FT.
SCENARIO «7 - CREH #2312:
CONDITIONS: time = 08:02:14; altitude = 32990 FT; level
flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command to avoid a
conflicting aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing underneath
the TCAS aircraft. Unlike scenario 3, the climb maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant
range (824 FT, 176 FT) at CPA compared to continuing level
flight at the assigned altitude. This scenario is similar to
scenario 3 but had a 14 second time interval between RA and
CPA and a slant range of 5309 FT (.87 NM) at CPA. In this
case, the TCAS maneuver improved the separation between the
TCAS aircraft and FOG 26.
SCENARIO #8 - CREH #2312:
CONDITIONS: time = 08:22:27; altitude = 12058 FT;
descending; descent rate = -48.86 FPS or -2931 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command followed by a "climb" command. The maneuver resulted
in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (832
FT, 104 FT) at CPA compared to continuing to descend at -2931
FPM.
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SCENARIO «9 - CREU #2312
CONDITIONS:
flight.
time = 10:02:09; altitude = 10095 FT; level
NARRATIVE: The crew received "climb to cross" command
followed by a "climb" command. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (683 FT, 432
FT) at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the
assigned altitude.
SCENARIO #10 - CREW #2312:
CONDITIONS: time = 10:06:52; altitude = 7639 FT; descending;
descent rate = -28.8 FPS or -1728 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command calling for no descent greater than 500 FPM. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (683 FT, 188 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent at -1728 FPM.
SCENARIO #11 - CREW #2422:
CONDITIONS:
flight.
time = 04:28:33; altitude = 33004 FT; level
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend to cross" command to
avoid an intruder aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing below
the TCAS aircraft. CPA occurred 17 seconds after the command
was given. The maneuver resulted in a decrease in altitude
separation and slant range (-605 FT, -22 FT) at CPA compared
to continuing level at the assigned altitude. This is the
second of three similar incidents involving FOG 26 that is
under investigation. The slant range at CPA in this case was
9009 FT (1.5 NM)
.







= 2260 FT; descending;
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command calling for no descent greater than 500 FPM. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (229 FT, 51 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the
descent at -1171 FPM.
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maneuver resulted in an increase in
slant range (855 FT, 435 FT) at CPA









15; altitude = 3760 FT; descending;
or -1957 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a
maneuver resulted in an increase in
slant range (692 FT, 210 FT) at CPA
the descent at -1957 FPM.






time = 07:14:48; altitude = 32991 FT; level
NARRATIVE: The crew
avoid an intruder
underneath the TCAS a
the command was gi
maneuver resulted in
slant range (1608 FT,
level flight at the
CPA in this case was
than the slant range
In this case, a "de
situation.
received a "descend to cross" command to
aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing
ircraft. CPA occurred 26 seconds after
ven. Unlike scenarios 3 and 11, this
an increase in altitude separation and
316 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining
assigned altitude. The slant range at
5559 FT (0.9 NM) which is much smaller
s in the two scenarios mentioned above,
scend to cross" command improved the
SCENARIO #16 - CREN #3111:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:37:15; altitude = 11647
descending; descent rate = -26.54 FPS or -1592 FPM.
FT;
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (1323 FT, 185 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent at -1592 FPM.
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SCENARIO #17 - CREH #3111:
CONDITIONS: time = 09:28:25; altitude = 10016 FT; level
flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb to cross" command.
The maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation
and slant range (1451 FT, 1536 FT) at CPA compared to
maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO #18 - CREH #3221:
CONDITIONS: time = 06:63:04; altitude = 3937 FT; descending;
descent rate = -28.49 FPS or -1709 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command followed by a "climb" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant
range (1048 FT, 197 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the
descent at -1709 FPM.
SCENARIO #19 - CREH #3221:
CONDITIONS: time = 09:54:04; altitude = 5175




NARRATIVE: The crew used the information from the traffic
advisory display to anticipate the collision situation
developing and started to climb shortly before they received
a "climb" command from the resolution advisory display. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (725 FT, 172 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent to their assigned level off altitude of 5000 FT.
SCENARIO #20 - CRBH #3312:
CONDITIONS:
descent rate
time - 01:21:09; altitude =
= -13.82 FPS or -829 FPM.
1903 FT; descending;
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (254 FT, 224 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent at -829 FPM.
SCENARIO #21 - CREH #3312:
CONDITIONS:
descent rate
time = 02:33:07; altitude = 5189 FT; descending;
= -19.59 FPS or -1175 FPM.
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NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (372 FT, 130 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent at -1175 FPM.
SCENARIO «22 - CREN #3312:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:43:86; altitude = 12156 FT;
descending; descent rate = -26.06 FPS or -1563 FPM.
NARRATIVE: This is another case where the crew used the
information from the traffic advisory display to anticipate
the collision situation developing and started to level off
before an "adjust vertical speed" command was received from
the resolution advisory display. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (184 FT, 61
FT) at CPA compared to continuing to descend at their
original descent rate, which was greater than 2000 FPM prior
to the crew-initiated level off.
SCENARIO #23 - CREN #3422:
CONDITIONS: time - 03:54:10; altitude = 32982 FT; level
flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend to cross" command to
avoid an intruder aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing
underneath the TCAS aircraft. CPA occurred 15 seconds after
the command was given. The maneuver resulted in a decrease
in altitude separation and slant range (-389 FT, -19 FT) at
CPA compared to continuing level at the assigned altitude.
This is the third of three similar incidents involving FOG 26
that is being studied. The slant range at CPA in this case
was 9075 FT (1.5 NM) .
SCENARIO «24 - CREN «3422:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:20:34; altitude = 6983 FT; level
flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew was leveling at 7000 FT when they
received a "descend" command to avoid conflicting traffic at
7500 FT. CPA occurred four seconds after the resolution
alert was issued. The maneuver resulted in a small increase
in altitude separation and slant range (37 FT, 13 FT) at CPA
compared to remaining level. It appears that the system did
not consider the conflicting aircraft a threat until the TCAS
crew arrested their descent and leveled off. The actual
altitude separation between aircraft at CPA was 560 FT with a
slant range of 1496 FT.
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SCEMilRIO «25 - CREH #3422:
CONDITIONS: time = 09:17:36; altitude = 5370 FT; climbing;
climb rate = +12.78 FPS or +766 FPM; clearance = "descend and
maintain 5000 FT".
NARRATIVE: This case is similar to scenario 19. The crew
used the information from the traffic advisory display to
anticipate the collision situation developing and started to
climb shortly before a "climb" command from the resolution
advisory display was received. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (784 FT, 184
FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent to their
assigned level off altitude of 5000 FT.
SCENARIO «26 - CREH «4111:
CONDITIONS:
flight.















is similar to scenario 15
cross" command to avoid a
was climbing below the TCAS
after the command was give
3, 11, and 23, the maneuver resulted
in altitude separation and slant range (4
CPA compared to maintaining level fli
altitude. The slant range at CPA in this











SCENARIO «27 - CREN «4111:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:34:16; altitude = 12324
descending; descent rate = -55.72 FPS or -3343 FPM.
FT;
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command which required no descent greater than 1000 FPM. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (1463 FT, 158 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent at -3343 FPM.
SCENARIO #28 - CREN #4221:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:10:59;
flight.
altitude = 32995 FT; level
NARRATIVE: This case is similar to scenarios 15 and 26.
The crew received a "descend to cross" command to avoid an
intruder aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing underneath the
40
TCAS aircraft. CPA occurred 41 seconds after the command
was given. The maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude
separation and slant range (1221 FT, 188 FT) at CPA compared
to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude. The
slant range at CPA in this case was 5998 FT (.99 NM).
SCENARIO #29 - CREH #4221:
CONDITIONS: time - 06:31:28; altitude = 3018 FT; descending;
descent rate = -13.89 FPS or -833 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (21 FT, 13 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the
descent at -833 FPM.
SCENARIO #30 - CREH #4221:
CONDITIONS: time = 01:35:13; altitude = 2064 FT; leveling at
2000 FT.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (348 FT, 68 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining
level flight at the assigned altitude of 2000 FT.












NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend to cross" command,
the maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation
and slant range (501 FT, 38 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent at -772 FPM until level at 5000 FT.
SCENARIO #32 - CREN #4312
CONDITIONS:
flight.
time = 02:12:24; altitude = 5080 FT; level
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb"
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude
slant range (464 FT, 159 FT) at CPA compared
level flight at the assigned altitude.






time = 03:47:28; altitude = 3954 FT;
= -21.25 FPS or -1275 FPM.
descending;
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NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command followed by a "climb" command. The maneuver resulted
in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (1555
FT, 143 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent
at -1245 FPM.
SCENARIO #34 - CREM #4312:
CONDITIONS: time = 03:49:39;
descent rate = -12.67 FPS or





NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
requiring no descent greater than FPM. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant
range (168 FT, 51 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the
descent at -760 FPM until level at 2000 FT.
SCENARIO «35 - CREN #4312:
CONDITIONS:
flight.
time = 07:07:53; altitude = 33008 FT; level
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command to avoid an
intruder aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing below the TCAS
aircraft. CPA occurred nine seconds after the
given. The maneuver resulted in an increase
separation and slant range (267 FT, 73 FT) at CPA
maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude,





SCENARIO #36 - CREH #4422:
CONDITIONS:
flight.
time = 04:23:00; altitude = 33086 FT; level
NARRATIVE: This scenario is similar to scenario 35. The
crew received a "climb" command to avoid an intruder aircraft
(FOG 26) which was climbing below the TCAS aircraft. CPA
occurred 15 seconds after the command was given. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (495 FT, 88 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining
level flight at the assigned altitude. The slant range at
CPA was 5266 FT ( . 86 NM)
.
SCENARIO #37 - CREN #4422:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:43:56; altitude = 12035
descending; descent rate = -37.95 FPS or -2277 FPM.
FT;
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NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command requiring no descent greater than 2000 FPM. The crew
reacted by significantly reducing their descent rate. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (400 FT, 263 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent at -2277 FPM.
SCENARIO «38 - CREW «4422:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:49:10; altitude = 6998 FT; level
flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (311 FT, 284 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining
level flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO «39 - CREH #4422:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:10:44; altitude = 3906 FT; descending;
descent rate = -18.21 FPS or -1092 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed"
command which required no descent greater than 500 FPM. The
crew significantly reduced their descent rate and even
climbed slightly. The maneuver resulted in an increase in
altitude separation and slant range (536 FT, 66 FT) at CPA
compared to continuing the descent at -1092 FPM.
SCENARIO «40 - CRBN #4422:
CONDITIONS: time = 10:26:46; altitude = 4947 FT; level
flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (471 FT, 129 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining
level flight at the assigned altitude.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The TCAS II system maneuver commands resulted in
increased vertical separations and slant range distances
between TCAS equipped aircraft and conflicting aircraft for
37 of the 40 scenarios studied. The three scenarios (3,
11, 23) which showed a decrease in vertical separation and
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slant range (miss distance) at the closest point of approach
(CPA) are unexpected results and will be examined in depth.
All three had the following common characteristics: the
conflicting aircraft's call sign was "FOG 26"; the
conflicting aircraft was climbing rapidly underneath the TCAS
aircraft when the resolution alert (RA) was issued; the TCAS
aircraft was straight and level at approximately 33000 feet;
and the resolution alert called for a "descend to cross"
maneuver. The time interval between the RA and CPA on all
three scenarios (5 sees, 17 sees, 15 sees) was shorter than
the average time for the 40 cases (23 sees). The slant
ranges at CPA for these three cases were in excess of 9000
feet or 1.48 nautical miles (11458 FT, 9009 FT, 9075 FT).
There were six other FOG 26 scenarios in this study (7, 15,
26, 28, 35, 36) which all showed increases in vertical
separation and slant range at CPA as a result of performing
the recommended evasive maneuver. Three of these six
scenarios (7, 35, 36) received "climb" commands from the
TCAS system. The other three scenarios (15, 26, 28)
received "descend to cross" commands (similar to scenarios
3, 11, and 23); but, in these cases, the times from RA to CPA
(26 sees, 24 sees, 41 sees) were longer than the average.
Also, these three scenarios (15, 26, 28) showed much shorter
slant ranges at CPA (5559 FT, 6629 FT, 5998 FT) than the
three scenarios with decreased separation (3, 11, 23).
After comparing the results of all the FOG 26 scenarios, it
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appears that there may be a problem with the collision
avoidance logic when the TCAS aircraft is at a high altitude
and must maneuver to avoid a rapidly climbing aircraft with a
slant range that is over 9000 feet. The TCAS logic may be
predicting a time for CPA that is longer than the time which
actually occurred for these incidents. The short times
between RA and CPA may also be responsible for the incorrect
responses by the TCAS system. In the three cases where the
separation between aircraft decreased, it appears that a
"climb" command (or no command at all) would have been better
than a "descend to cross" command. Fortunately, the
situations where the TCAS logic provided erroneous commands
occur at long ranges and do not appear to pose a potential
collision threat. An investigation of these three incidents
is currently underway.
The results (Appendix B) of this study also demonstrate
that three scenarios (1, 2, 9) would have resulted in
dangerous situations if the recommended TCAS maneuver had not
been performed. Without a TCAS maneuver, these three
scenarios would have resulted in slant ranges (miss
distances) of less than 500 feet with altitude separations
between the two aircraft of less than 300 feet. It should be
noted that no dangerous situations developed when the crews
used the TCAS system.
An analysis of the flight station video recordings
indicates that the "adjust vertical speed" voice command was
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confusing for some of the pilots. The terminology of this
command is ambiguous in that it does not specify an increase
or a decrease in climb or descent rate. Several of the
Captains told the pilot at the controls to "level off" when
the resolution advisory display required only a decrease in
descent rate. An improvement in the wording of this command
or a better presentation on the RA display may help to reduce
the confusion that was noted in this study.
Overall, the TCAS II system should result in a
significant enhancement to the "see and avoid" procedures in
the cockpit and dramatically improve the safety of airline
travel.
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V. RESOLUTION ADVISORy DISPLAY EXPERIMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
An experiment was conducted in the laboratories of the
Aeronautical Human Factors Branch of NASA-Ames to evaluate
pilot responses to collision avoidance maneuver commands
using computer simulations of three versions of the TCAS II
resolution advisory (RA) display (Figure 14). The type of RA
display currently in use consists of a modified instantaneous
vertical speed indicator (IVSI) which has an arc of red
"eyebrow" lights to notify pilots of impending danger. The
lights illuminate when the TCAS II system detects a potential
collision threat and signals the pilots to evaluate their
vertical velocity to increase the safety margin between the
TCAS aircraft and a conflicting aircraft. Pilots are trained
to respond to a resolution alert by "keeping the IVSI needle
out of the red lights" by climbing, descending, or by
avoiding a climb or descent rate that would put the aircraft
in danger. Two modifications to the current system were
designed to test the hypothesis that a different lighting
pattern might be more effective than the "red only" version.
In order to provide the pilots a target to aim for, instead
of an area to avoid, "red and green" and "green only"
lighting arrangements were developed for the IVSI. For both
of the new arrangements, the green lights only illuminated
47
RED ONLY
NOTE: Warning arc is red from
-B000 FPn to 1500 FPn.
RED iiJJ3 GRSEN
NOTE; Warning arc is red from
-6000 FPn to +1500 FPn and
green from +1500 FPn to
2500 FPn.
GREEN ONLY
NOTE: Warning arc is green from
1500 FPn to +2500 FPn.
Figure 14. Three Versions of the RA Display
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when evasive maneuvers were required (corrective RA) and not
when an RA was issued to warn against an unsafe vertical
speed requiring no pilot action (preventative RA). Pilots
were trained to use the two alternate versions of the RA
displays by applying the following rules: (1) "Get the
needle out of the red and into the green" for the "red and
green" version; (2) "Get the needle into the green" for the
"green only" version. This report describes the experiment
and the findings.
B. PROCEDURES
A graphics program was developed to present six groups of
14 RA displays to 36 volunteer pilots. The subjects had both
military (75%) and civilian (25%) backgrounds, and various
levels of flight experience ranging from 150 to 11000 hours
of flight time (mean = 1913 hours, median = 650 hours).
For this experiment, each pilot received individual
training which included a detailed briefing on each of the
three versions of the RA display ("red only", "red and
green", "green only") and a practice session using a
demonstration program consisting of six example presentations
(two of each type). The procedure used by each subject was
as follows:
(1) Press two buttons on a computer mouse to allow the
the computer terminal to exhibit the RA display.
The IVSI depicting the current vertical speed
appeared one second before the warning arc of colored
lights illuminated. (Figure 14)
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(2) Evaluate the position of the needle on the IVSI to
determine if the aircraft is climbing or descending.
(3) Interpret the warning lights to determine whether
a climb, descent or no action is required by using the
general rules explained above.
(4) Respond to the warning by moving the mouse aft to
climb, or forward to descend. The mouse was used to
simulate a control stick (or yoke) in an aircraft and
the IVSI needle was assumed to respond to a climb
or descent in the normal manner.
(5) A dialog box appeared below the RA display after
each response notifying the pilot that the direction
of motion and reaction time had been measured.
The training emphasized that accuracy of the response
direction (climb or descent) was much more important than
short reaction times, since an incorrect climb or descent
could significantly degrade the aircraft's safety margin.
After completion of the training session, each
participant responded to 42 RA displays grouped into three
sets of 14 of the same color pattern (red, red and green,
green) . The pilots knew in advance which version of the
display would be presented because an example RA display was
the first display in each set of 14. Each set also contained
one preventative RA display which required no movement of the
mouse (control stick). A second run of 42 displays was
presented after the first run was completed. The order of
presentation for the three versions of the RA display (red,
red and green, green) was counterbalanced across subjects.
The 14 display presentations were sequenced in one of nine
random orders.
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Recorded data included the direction of the response and
the time period between the illumination of the colored
warning arc and the movement of the mouse (reaction time).
All subjects completed a subjective questionnaire at the
completion of the experiment and rated the effectiveness of
the three versions of the display. A statistical analysis
was performed using the acquired data.
C. RESULTS
To compare the effectiveness of the three versions of the
RA display, an analysis of pilot performance was conducted
with reaction time and response accuracy (number of errors)
as the dependent variables.
From an evaluation of the reaction time data, the
following results were obtained:
(1) A significant difference in reaction time due to
display color was found (F = 19.21, degrees of
freedom (df) = 2,34, p<.001). A post-hoc paired
comparison showed a significant difference between
the "red only" and "green only" displays (F = 32.46,
df = 1,35, p<.001), and also between the "red only"
and "red and green" displays (F = 26.07, df = 1,35
p<.001). The "red only" showed longer reaction times
(mean = 1.1856 seconds (sec), standard deviation
(sd) = .5857) than the "red and green" (mean = .9998
sec, sd = .5909) and the "green only" (mean = .9524
sec, sd = . 4453)
.
(2) Learning effects were noted in pilot reaction times
for the first set of 42 displays (runl) and the
second set (run2) (F = 45.31, df = 1,35, p<.001).
Run2 tiroes (mean = .9347 sec, sd = .5029) were
shorter than runl times (mean = 1.1571, sd = .5693).
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(3) Figure 15 shows a significant interaction that was
observed when evaluating the effects of run number
and display color on reaction time (F = 5.55,
df = 1,35, p<.05). Learning effects are more
pronounced for the "red only" version of the
display.
(4) Figure 16 shows the significant interaction that
occurred when a comparison of the display colors and
the scenario numbers (listed in Appendix D) was
evaluated with respect to reaction time (F = 5.24,
df = 11,21, p<.001). "Red only" reaction times were
longer than the "green only" times for every
scenario and were also longer than the "red and green"
times with one exception (scenario 11). Scenario 7
produced the longest reaction times for all three
display colors.
(5) No significant differences in reaction time were
noted among the three versions of the display for the
different commands (climbs or descents).
Evaluating the accuracy of the pilot's responses by
tabulating the number of incorrect climbs and descents
(errors) produced the following results:
(1) The overall error rate for the experiment was 2% with
no significant learning effects noted between runl and
run2, although fewer errors occurred on the second
run.
(2) A post-hoc paired comparison of the number of errors
using the "red only" and "red and green" displays
showed a significant difference (F = 8.03, df = 1,35,
p<.01). The "red only" display produced the most
errors (27) while the least occurred using the "red
and green" display (10). The use of the "green only"
display resulted in 18 errors.
(3) Figure 17 shows a significant interaction between the
command called for by the display and the color of
the display with respect to the frequency of errors.
The "red and green" display appears to be the most
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(4) Significant effects on the number of errors were also
noted for each of the display colors as a result of
the scenario number. Figure 18 shows the total number
of errors for each scenario. The greatest number of
errors (7) occurred using the scenario 13
"red only" display. Scenario 13 was a preventative RA
presentation which required no climb or descent from
the pilot.
Pilot experience levels produced no significant effects
on reaction time or response accuracy. Pilot preferences
also showed no apparent effects on the results.
An analysis of the pilot questionnaires showed that 92%
(33 out of 36) of the pilots rated the "red and green" (19)
or the "green only" RA display (14) as the most effective for
signaling an evasive maneuver. The current RA display in the
TCAS II system ("red only") was rated the least effective of
the three versions by 24 pilots (67%). Several pilots
commented that they preferred the "red and green" lighting
configuration because it gave them both an area to avoid and
an area to aim for. Three of the more experienced pilots
stated that they would prefer to receive collision avoidance
commands from an altitude direction indicator (ADI) rather
than an instantaneous vertical speed indicator (IVSI). They
stated that maneuvers are routinely performed using the ADI
vice the IVSI.
Possible sources of error in the results may have been
induced by individual pilots having difficulty adjusting to
the partial system simulation. Some subjects had problems
using the computer mouse as a control stick and responding as
















flight simulator with a complete TCAS II system would have
enhanced the simulation. Upgrades to this experiment could
include animation of the IVSI needle and the use of a
"joystick." to replace the computer mouse. Animation of the
IVSI needle would have allowed the measurement of the amount
of overshoot of the recommended vertical speeds and a measure
of the time required for each subject to reach the commanded
vertical speed.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The results of this experiment demonstrate that the two
alternate designs of the TCAS II resolution advisory display
("red and green", "green only") are more effective than the
current display ("red only"). The alternate designs
produced faster reaction times, fewer errors, and were judged
to be more effective by 92% of the pilots who participated in
this study. The "red and green" version of the display was
more effective at preventing errors and was chosen as most
effective by 53% of the pilots. The "green only" lighting
pattern produced the shortest reaction times and was rated as
most effective by 39% of the pilots.
Both alternate versions of the display ("red and green",
"green only") were effective at eliminating unnecessary
responses to preventative warnings, while the current TCAS II
RA display version ("red only") produced seven errors of this
type.
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The information generated by this experiment may be
useful for future versions of collision avoidance displays.
In order to determine whether it would be feasible to change




VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
As a result of the three studies completed in this
report, answers are now available for the three questions
posed at the beginning of this paper.
The first study examined aircraft maneuvers based solely
on traffic advisory information. There were 14 cases during
the NASA-Ames simulation where the pilots successfully
maneuvered the aircraft to avoid a potential collision by
utilizing TA information. These maneuvers were conducted
despite training which emphasized that maneuvers should be
performed only on the basis of warnings displayed on the
resolution advisory (RA) display. Pilot training procedures
should be developed to optimize the use of the TCAS II
traffic advisory display, while allowing pilots to use their
experience and judgment to ensure aircraft safety of flight.
The pilots appeared to gain confidence in the system as the
simulation progressed and were eager to use all the available
information. Standardized TCAS procedures should be
developed and adopted. Additionally, frequent practice in
flight simulators should provide valuable reinforcement to
this training. As the pilots become more familiar with the
TCAS II system and gain confidence in the collision
avoidance maneuvers presented on the RA display, this
tendency to maneuver on the TA information should be reduced.
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The second study was concerned with the results of the
TCAS-directed collision avoidance maneuvers. Computer-aided
analysis of data determined that, in 37 of 40 scenarios
investigated, the avoidance maneuvers directed by the TCAS II
system increased altitude separations and miss distances at
CPA. Three similar cases where the miss distances decreased
were examined and appear not to be a threat to safety of
flight. These three maneuvers were long range encounters at
high altitudes and appear to result from the system logic
calculating an erroneous time to CPA in excess of that
actually observed. In general, the pilots responded
accurately to the commands from the system and successfully
avoided many potential mid-air collisions. From an
examination of flight station video tapes, the presentation
on the RA display occasionally caused minor confusion for the
pilots. These observations resulted in the motivation to
proceed with a study of alternate lighting configurations for
the RA display.
The final phase of this study considered alternate
designs for the RA display in an effort to determine the most
effective means to direct collision avoidance maneuvers.
Volunteer pilots reacted to collision avoidance maneuver
commands from three different versions of the RA display
("red only", "red and green", and "green only"). The "red
and green" version of the display proved to be more effective
than the current "red only" version by producing
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significantly faster reaction times, fewer errors, and a much
higher effectiveness rating from the pilots. In general, the
participants stated that they preferred an area to aim for
(green warning arc) and an area to avoid (red warning arc).
The "red and green" display gave both cues. This information
may be useful in future upgrades of the current system or in
the design of collision avoidance systems of the future.
The information contained in this report is based on
simulations rather than operational testing of the system in
actual aircraft. However, the results of this study should
provide information useful in the development of pilot
training procedures and system upgrades to maximize the
operational effectiveness of the TCAS II system. With proper
use, this system has the potential to dramatically enhance
flight safety on the conjested airways and in the busy




file: LLTCAS FCkTBAN Al
PROGf^AM LLTCAS
• THIS 3SOGPJAM C0><PUrE5 THE »< I S S DISTANCE (SLANT PANGE ) BETWEEN
• TWO AIRCRAFT ON A NE A« COLLISION COURSE ASSLMINC NEITHER AIRCRAFT
• TAKES EVASIVE ACTION. THE T CA S (TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION
• AVOIDANCE SYSTEM) AIHCRAFT'S LATITUDE. LONGITUDE AND ALTITUDE
• ARE READ IN FROM RECORDS OF THE NASA-AMES 727 SIMULATOR STUDY OF
« PILOTS USING THE TCAS SYSTEM. THIS OATA IS COMPARED TO THE
• LATITUJEi LONGITUDE AND ALTITUDE DATA FROM THE CONFLICTING
9 AIRCRAFT'S RECORDS. RANGE, oLANT RANGE, AND ALTITUDE SEPEHATION
« DISTANCES ARE COMPUTED. THE PRCGI»AM IS THEN MODIFIED TO PREDICT
• THE DISTANCES THAT JCULD HAVE WESULTEO IF NO AVOIDANCE MANEUVEB
• HAS PERFORMED. THIS IS DONE BY EVALUATING THE VIDEO TAPES OF
• THE ENCOUNTER, THE SIMULATOR OATA, AND THE FLIGHT CLEARANCES
« ISSUED TO THE AIRCRAFT. THE TCAS ALTITUDE IS THEN MODIFIED TO
• EVALUATE THE MISS DISTANCES WITHOUT THE MANEUVER.
««»« S« «^ ^9 S%«:»^:$«:^«$«£:;£C^«79««4=K^«««^ 37 «««««««:«$««$$«««« ft «««««««« ««*«««:
ft VARIABLES USED ARE:
ft FSHNG: ARBITRARY LARGE RANGE VALUE
» PAi_T,CALT: ALTITUDES OF TCAS AND CONFLICTING AIRCRAFT
• ox: DISTANCE 3HT>*cEN AI;RCRAFT In LONGITUDE (IN FEETJ
• DY: distance BET«£E.m AIRCRAFT IN LATITUDE (IN FEET)
• PLT,PLG: TCAS AIRCRAFT LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE
• CLT.CLG: CJNFLICTING AIRCRAFT LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE
• POZ: TCAS AIRCRAFT VcRTICAL VELOCITY FOR NO MANEUVER CASE
• LAlT: required level off ALTITUDE FOR TCAS CLIMB/DESCENT
• fJNG: RANGE IN THE A,r PLANE
• SRNG: range in THE X,V,Z PLANE ( MI S5 DISTANCE)
ft OZ: ALTITUDE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AIRCRAFT




• DOUBLE PRECISION USED TO TNCt^EASE THE ACCURACY OF THE CALCULATION
DOueLE PRECISION OX , DY , PLT , PL G , PAL T , CLT ,CLG ,C ALT ,LAL T , MLAT
REAL RNG, SftNG,FSRNG,PI ,0Z
ftftftftftftftENTEH THE LEVEL OFF ALTITUjE IF RECJUIREO (LALT)
DATA TIME,LALT,BI,FSRNG/1,100 00.0,J. 1*1 59, -jqO 00.0/
e^ftftftftftTHE NEXT LINE IS USED TO ENTER THE TCAS AIRCRAFT'S INITIAL
*ft*ftftftftALTI ruDE AND CLIMB/OESCEKT RATE IF EVALUATING NO MANEUVER CASH
DATA PALT ,PDZ/5000. 00000 ,000. 00/
10 FTRMI= • ( 1 OX ,Fq. 5, 1X,F10.5I •
HEAD ( 2 0, FMT=FORMt , END = 20) PL T , PLG
FORM 1= • (30X,F 1 1 .« » •
• THE FOLLOWING 3 HEaO STATEMENTS READ IN OATA FROM REMOTE FILES
« CONTAINING SIMULATOR DATA
ftftftftftftftXHt NEXT LINE IS DELETED •HEN EVALUATING THE NO MANEUVER CASE
»ft» READ ( 2 1 , FMT=FORMI ,ENO=20)PALT
F0RMI=M2 0X,Fa.5,2X,Fl0.S,lX,Fll.*)«
READ (22,FMT=FaRMI,END=20)CLT ,CLG,CALT
« THE NEXT 3 LINES CONVERT THE LAT/LUNG DIFFERENCES TO DISTANCES
• IN FEET BETWEEN THE TWO AIRCWAFT IN THE X ANO Y PLANE.
MLAT=ABS( (PLT*CLT)/2.0»
0X = ( PLU-CLGI«60.0«60 76.l 033*COS( ( MLA TftP I) / I 80 . )
DY=( PLT-CLT )»60 .0*60 76. 1033
• THE NEXT LINE COMPUTES THE ALTITUDE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AIRCRAFT
DZ=PALT-CALT
• COMPUTE RANGE IN X,Y PLA^E
HNG=SQRT( OXft«2*0Y««2
)
« COMPUTE SLANT RANGE C^ISS DISTANCE)
SRNG=Sv,RT (RNG**2*OZ*»2 I
• PRINT THE RESULTS
PRINT*, •TIME='
,
TIME, 'RNG = • ,RNG, 'SPNG^' ,SRNG, • ALTD=« ,DZ
• CHECK TO SEE IF RANGE IS DECREASING (IF IT IS NOT END PROGRAM)
IF ( SRNG.GT.FSRNG) GO TO 20
• IF RANGE IS DECREASING LCOP TO OBTAIN MORE DATA
FSHN&=SRNG
• THIS IF STATEMENT ALLO«S THE USER TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF OATA
• POINTS USED OR TIME PE B I CO EXAMINED
IF ( TIME.GE.90)CC TO 20
TIME=TI ME*!
ftftftftftftTHE NEXT LINE IS USED FOR THE NO MANEUVEB CASE
PALT=PALT»POZ
•ftftftftftftTHE NEXT 3 LINES ARE USEC IF A LEVEL OFF RESTRICTION IS REGUIREO









file: results results *l
««* SCENARIO I «««
FT2111 SCeNA.^10 I KlTHOUT MANELVER (CCNTlNtlED DESCENT!
TIM£ = 17 RMG = 733.9567*0 SHNG = 789.966)328 ALTC = -292.203857
TIME = »«*« 18 RKOs 297.05*979 SaNG = 418.679150 ALTD = -295.329 102
TIME = 19 RNG = 374.66ieC5 SRN& = 479.005615 ALTO = -298.454346
FT21 11 SCENAR 10 1 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIME = 17 RNG = 733.956740 SRNGs 988 .a36670 ALTO = -662.646 193
TI>*E = •**« »a RNG = 297.052979 SRNGs 746.44«Sd0 ALTOS -694. 791260
TIMt = 19 RNC = 374.66ia6S S«NG = 793. 72021S ALTD = -699.728760
««« SCENAHIC 2 «*•
FT21 11 SCENAH 10 2 WITHOUT MANELVEP (CONTINUED LEVEL)
TIMES 19 RNC = 4R<».28a330 SRNG = 514.309570 ALTO = -I 73. 14S493
TiMe = **•* 20 RNG = 42t. 200439 SRNG= 443. 175293 ALTO = -121 .480499
TIME = 21 RNG = 72 1.542236 SHNiiS 724.91 1621 ALTO = -69.8104858
FT211 I SCENAR 10 2 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE »»ANeUVEH
TiMe = 19 RNG = 484.268330 SSNG = 1 166.69531 ALTD = -lOei .43457
TIME = «*»« 20 RNG = 42e. 200439 SRNG= 109 1.97485 ALTOS -1005.36719
TIME = 21 RNG = 721.642236 SRNG= 1 184. 10522 ALTO = -938.tJ72803










J CONTINUED LEVEL)SCENARIO 1 WITHOUT MANELV
4 RNCs 11449.6399 ShNGs
»«** 5 RNGs 11411.9375 SRNGs
6 RNGS 11419.7227 SRNG=
SCENAH 10 1 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE
4 RNGs 11449.6398 SRNGs
»*«« 5 RNGs 11411.9375 SRNGs
6 hNGs 11419.7227 SriNGs





























«tt» SCENARIO 4 «««
FT2221 SCE,><AHIO 2 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED DECENT)
TIMES 17 HNGs 9742.52344 SRNGs 9767.73437
TIMES »»«« 18 RNGS 9743.69531 SRNGs
TIMES 15 RNGs 9765.95703 SRNGs
FT2221 SCENARIO 2 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIMES 17 RNGs 9742.52344 ' SRNGs 9888.92578
TIMES «*«« IB RNGs 9743.69531 SRNGs
















*•* SCENARIO 5 **«













































««* SCENARIO 6 «*«
FT2221 SCENA<«IQ 4 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED DESCENT UNTIL LEVEL
TIMES 25 RNGs 5458.90625 SRNGs
TIMES «»«* 26 RNCs 5423.91016 SRNGs
TIMES 27 RNGs S443.S3S16 SRNGs
note: required level off AT 5000 FEET,
FT2221 SCENA»< 10 4 WITH COLLISICN AVOIDANCE
TIMES 25 RNGs 5458.906.^5 SRNGs
TIMES «««« 26 RNGs 5423. 9101^ SRNGs
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*** SCENARIO 7 ***
















1 alTH COLLI SIGN





















ALTO = 1527 .9841 3
ALTD = 1522 .0078
1
*** SCENARIO 3 ***













TI?^e = **** 36
TIMt = 37
SRNG = 6347.21094 ALTO
SRNG = 6325.22266 ALTO
SRNG = 6409.71 094 ALTO
VOIDANCE MANEUVER
SriNG = 6467.53906 ALTO
SRNG = 6429.51562 ALTO







»** SCENARIO 9 S**
















































*** SCENARIO 10 **«






































*** SCENARI 1 1
FT2422 SCENARIO 1 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)
TXMEc










































*** SCENARIO 12 ***





































*** SCENARIO 13 «**
FT2422 SCENARIO 3 WITHOUT MANEUVtR (CONTINUED DESCENT UNTIL LEVEL OFF)
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file: wesults results A 1
TIME= 26 HNG= 1073.1lfl*t SkNG=
TI«t= **** 27 HNG= ttl^.43ie'»l SHNC =
TIMe= 2a SNG= 101*. 32642 SHNG-=
NUTt: RfcQUIREJ LEVEL OFF AT 5000 FEtT.
FT2422 SCENARIO J alTH COLLISICN AVOIDANCE
TIM£= 2b RMG= 1073.1ie4l S«NG=
TIMe= «*** 27 RNG= dl2. 431641 SaNG=





















*** SCENARIO 14 ***








Tiy£ = 27 RNG =
TIME = **** 28 RNG =
TIME = 29 RNG =
FT31 I I SCENARI I WITH
TIME = 27 RNG-
TIME = **** 28 HNG =














«*« SCENARIO IS ***
FT3111 SCENARIO 2 WITHCUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)
TIME= 25 RNG=
TiyE= »«** 26 RNG=
TIME= 27 RNG=
FT3111 SCENARIO 2 WITH
T1ME= 25 HNG=
TIME= «*** 26 HNG=
TIME= 27 RNG=
5309. 1132'^ SRNG= 5316.22266 ALTO:
5236.97656 SRNG= 5243.30859 ALTD:
5273.07812 SRNG= 5279.14453 ALTO:
COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
5309.1132^ SRNG= 5614.01172 ALTC:
5236.97656 SRNG= 5559.34765 ALTO:





- I 365 . 59351
-I 864.35718
*** SCENARIO 16 *««








33 RNG= 5387.03516 Sr<NG= 5887.68359
34 RNG= 5858.81641 SRNG= 5860.27344
35 RNG= 5367.98047 SRNG-= 5870.55859
3 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
34 RNG= 5858.81641 SRNG= 6059.53125
35 RNG= 5367.98047 SRNG= 6045.48323















FT31 1 1 SCENAR I 4 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)
TIME= 20 RNG= 293.120117 SHNG= 461.708984 ALT0= 356.729492
TIME= **«* 21 RNG= 93.8893565 SRNG= 419.052734 ALT0= 408.399414
TIME= 22 RNG= 349.162842 SRNG= 576.496338 ALT0= 456.730225
FT3iH SCENARIO 4 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIME= 18 RNG= 939.338623 SRNO= 1982.65405 ALTO= 1746.01270
TIMc= **** 19 RNG= 604.302246 SRNG= 1955.93652 ALTDa 1860.24390
TIME= 20 HNC= 293.120117 SRNO= 1967.56006 ALTO= 1965.82715
*** SCENARIO 13 »*«

















































*«* SCENARIO 19 *«*
FT3221 SCENARIO 2 WITHOUT MANELVER (CCNTINUED DESCENT UNTIL LEVEL OFF)
TIME= 28 HNG= 1702.82985 SRNG= 1703.42139 ALTO= 44.9257965
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file: results HeSULTS Al
TlMEr ***S 29 RNG= l626.973aM S^NG= lfi27. 59375 ALTO^ -i4. 9257965
TIMfc= 30 SNG= 1730.423e3 SkNC.= 1731.00659 ALrO= 44.9257965
note: Clearance qeouired level cff at 5000 feet.
FT3221 SCENAk to 2 WITH COLLI SIGN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIMt= 28 riNG= 1702.42866 SHSG- 1970.4J311 ALTD= 773.68250^
TIMe= S:*s:* 29 «NG= 1626.973aB SRNG= 1800.20142 ALTD= 770.508057
TlMt= 30 HNG= 1730.42383 SRNG= 1894.2J340 ALTD= 770,554687
**:* SCENARIO ^0 ««*
FT3312 SCENARIO I WITHOUT MANELVi^P (CONTINUED OESCENT)
TIMe= 20 RNG= 631.50781? SHNG= d3b. 599854 ALTD= -548.723389
TIME= **** 21 RNG= 365.420654 SRNG= 670.811523 ALTO= -562.543945
TlMe= 22 RNG= 473.935791 SaNG= 746.1972(36 ALTD= -576.363770
FT3312 SCENARIO 1 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIME= 20 «NG= 631.507812 SRNG:: 1016.96655 ALTD= -797.131836
TIMe= **** 21 HNG= 365.420654 SRNG= 894.323730 ALTO= -816.809032
TIMe= 22 RNG= 473.935791 SkNG= 957.734863 ALTO= -d32. 250488
*** SCENARIO 2 1 ««*
FT3312 SCENARIO 2 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED DESCENT)
TIME= 25 RNG= 1350.3J179 SRNG= 1368.52734 ALTO= -219.366943
TIMc= **** 26 aNG= 1126.99363 SRNG= 1152.04785 ALTD= -238.956940
TIM£= 27 RNG= 1364.48242 SRNG= 1383. "^6123 ALTO= -258.546875
FT3312 SCENARIO 2 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIMEr 23 HNG= 1 350 . 33 I 7'i SRNG= 1492.54395 ALTO= 634.777100
TIMe= **** 26 RNG= 1126.99365 SRNG= 1282.30.^11 ALTO= 611.713994
TIM£= 27 RNG= 1364.48242 SRNG= 1469.71704 ALTO= 597.867187
*** SCENARIO 22 ***
FT3312 SCENARIO 3 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED DESCENT)
TIMe= 16 RNG= 3613.11963 SRNG= 3817.74561 A(_TO= 1218.35669
TIME= **** 17 RNG= 3603.09221 SRNG= 3789.77905 ALTO= 1174.79858
TIME= la RNG= 3706.17114 ShNG= 3875.68628 ALTD= 1133.68506
FT3312 SCENArtlO 2 WITH CCLLlSICM AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIME= 16 RNG= 3618.11963 SRNG= 3877.70483 ALTO= 1394.92163
TIME= **:** 17 HNG= 36C3. 09229 SRNG= 3950.90161 ALTO= 1359.10620
TIMEr 18 RNG= 3706.17114 SRNG= 3936.22705 ALTO= 1325.96387
note: pilots OECREASEO THEIR RATE OF DESCENT PRIOR TO THE RA USING
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE TRAFFIC ADVISORY DISPLAY.
*** SCENARIO 23 ***
FT3422 SCENARIO 1 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)
TIMe= 14 RNG= 9094.4492? SRNG= 9121.75000 ALTD= 705.198975
TIME= *** 15 RNG= 9071.60937 SHNG= 9095.84375 ALTO= 663.525146
TIME= 16 RNG= 9075.67573 SRNG= 9096.95703 ALTD= 621.861328
FT3422 SCENARIO I WITH COLLISICN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TiyE= 14 RNG= 9094.44922 3HNG= 9101.55359 ALTD= 359.648193
TIME= **** 15 RNG= 9071.60937 SRNG= 9075.45312 ALTD= 264.173534
TI«E= lb RNG= 9075.67578 SRNG= 9077.23437 ALTD= 168.158188
NOTE: THIS IS A CASE WHERE THE COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER DECREASED
THE VERTICAL SEPARATION 3eTwEl£N THE TWO AIRCRAFT AT CPA. THE
TCAS COMMAND WAS "DESCEND TO CROSS".
*X::S SCENARIO 24 *«*
FT3422 SCENARIO 2 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)
RNG= 1404.76587 SR NG = 1496.462U9 ALTO= -515.785156
HNG= 1387.08325 SRNG- 1482.11768 ALTD= -522.182373
HNG= 1389.24854 SWNG= 1486.40771 ALTD= -528.530566
2 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
RNG= 1404.76587 SHNG= 1503.35937 ALTO= -535.464844
HNG= 1337.03325 SRNG= 1495.76074 ALTO= -559.733398
RNG= 1389.24854 SRNG= 1510.01587 ALTD= -591.7243o5
note: pilot descended and leveled off AT 7000 FEET JUST PRIOR TQ HA.
TIME = 3
TI«E = **** 4
TI v«E = 5
FT3422 SCENAR 10
TIMe = 3
TIME = »**« 4
TIM£ = 5
67
file: oESJUTS HESUUTi Al
CONFLICTING AIRCRAFT MAS AT 7500 FEET
THE TCAS AIHCKAFT LEVELED QrF.
AND WAS NOT A THREAT UNTIL
*** SCENAHIO 25 ***
FT3422 SCENArilO J WITHOUT MANELVtiR (CONTINUED DESCENT UNTIL LEVEL
TIMe= 21 RNG- 2298.30396 SWNG= 2301.ejqil ALTD=
TIMe= **** 22 HNG= 2112.44629 SRNG= 2116.29I7S ALTD=
TIME= 2J RNG= 2187.60522 SHNG= 2191.31865 ALTO=
NOTE: CLEARANCE REQUIRED LEVEL CFF AT 50 00 FEET
FT3422 SCENARIO 3 *ITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE 'ANEUVER
TlMe= 21 RNG= 2298.3039A SRNG= 2476.17041 ALTO=
TIMe= **c* 22 RNO= 2112.4462T SSNG= 2300.98584 ALTO=








*** SCENARIO 26 *»*
FT4111 SCENARIO 1 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)
TIMe= 23 ftNG= 6659.1210? S«NG= 6672.10156
TIMt= **** 24 RNG= 6616.39062 SSiNG= 6626.97266
TlMe= 25 RNG= 6623.61328 SRNG= 6631.96094
FT4111 SCENARIO I WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIHt= 23 WNG= 6659.12109 SWNG= 6667.66406
TIMe= **** 24 HNG= 6616.39062 SRNG= 6629.792^7













*** SCENARIO 27 **«
FT4111 SCENARIO 2 WITHCUT MANEUVPR (CONTINUED DESCENT)
TIME= 34 RNG=
TIME= *«** 35 kNO=
TIMe= 3b RNG=
FT4111 SCcNAPIQ 2 WITH
TIMe= 34 HNG-
TIVt= *«** 35 HNG=
TIMES 36RNG=
8441.61719 SRNG= 8442.37109 ALTO:
8387.00781 SRNG= 8389.05469 ALTC:
8437.70312 SHNG= 8441.64844 ALTO:
COLLISION AVOlOANCt MANEUVER
8441.61719 SRNG= 8605.96484 ALTO:
8387.00761 SWNG= 8547.53516 ALTC:








*** SCENARIO 28 «**



































*** SCENARIO 29 ««*
FT4221 SCENARIO 2 WITHOUT MANEUVER
TIME= 69 RNGs 1254.30127
TIME= **** 70 RNG= 1245.79932
TIM£= 71 RNG= 1361.92285
note: required level off at 2500 feet
ft4221 scenario 2 with collisicn avoidance
time= 69 hng= 1254.30127 srng=
TIME= »*»» 70 RNG= 1245.7993^ SriNG =
TIM£= 71 HNG= 1361.92285 SRNG=























««« SCENARIO 30 «««
FT4221 SCENARIO 3 WITHOUT MANEUVdR (CONTINUED DESCENT UNTIL LEVEL)
TIMe= 17 RNG= 1522.29463 SRNG=
TIMe= **«* 18 RNG= 1383.01367 SaNG=
TIMc= 19 RNG= 1434.6691? Sr<NG =
note: REQUIRED LEVEL OFF AT 2000 FEET
FT4221 SC!ZNAR lO 3 WITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIMES 17 RNG= 1522.29468 SRNG=












FILt: 1RE5ULT5 ^!ESULT3 41
TIMe= 19 RNG= I434.66qr> S« NG = 1500.7J755 Ai.TO= -<*40.J34 766
**:* SCENARIO 31 «*«
FT4^2l SC£NAkIO 4 WITHOUT MANEUVER {CONTINUED DESCENT UNTIL LEVEL OFF)
TIME: 23 WNij= 4028.14673 S.^NG= 402B. 39262 ALro= 44.5233917
TlMEr **:;:* 24 RNG= 3S70. 27441 Sf<NG= 3870.53052 ALTO= 44.5233<517
TIMe= 25 RNG= 3375.35352 SKNG= 3875.60913 ALT0= 44.5233917
note: REQUlr<ED LEVEL OFF AT 5000 rEET
FT4^21 SCEr4A-^ 10 4 *ITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIM£= 23 RNG= 4028.14673 3mNG= 4063.9o680 ALT0= -538.386719
TIMc= **=:* 24 RNG= 3870.27441 SRNo= 3909.56860 ALTD= -545.7<39062
TI^<E= 25 WNG= 3375.35352 S«NG= 3913.73926 ALTO= -S46.t>00731
*** SCENARIO 32 ***
FT4312 SCZNAhJ lO 1 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)
riME= 25 HiNG= 1231.13062 SHNG= 1245.50757 ALTO= 188.699188
TIME= **** 26 RNG= 1131.76953 SKNG= 1147.39233 ALTO= 188.699183
TIME= 27 HNG= 1457.76882 SRNG= 1469.35069 ALTO= 198.099189
FT4312 SCENA^eIQ 1 *ITH COLLISION AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIME= 25 RNG= 1231.13062 SHNG= 1393.55103 ALTO= 663.523193
TIN«E= **** 26 RNG= 1131.76953 Sf<NG= 1306.6o870 ALTO= 653.055176
TIME= 27 RNG- 1457.73882 SBNG= 1594.83350 ALTD= 646.796875
*** SCENARIO 33 ***
FT431<i SCENARIO 2 WITHOUT MA.NELVf^ (CONTINUED DESCENT)
T1ME= 23 RNG= 8385.43437 SRNo= 8885.66016 ALTD= 55.9360657
TIWE= **** 24 RNG= 8378.41797 SHNG= U373. 54297 AlTD= 47.1650586
TIV(E= 25 RNG= 8982.05469 SHNo= 6982.13672 ALTD= 39.4355621
FT4312 SCENARIO 2 wtTH COLLISION AVOIDANCE VANEUVER
TIME= 23 RNG= 8885.46437 S«NG= 9026.69141 ALTD= 1590.39526
TIMt= **** 24 RNG= 6878.41797 SHNG= 9021.94922 ALTD= 1602.39429
TIME= 25 RNG= 8962.05469 Sh(NG= 9126.16016 ALTD= 1615.39478
*** SCENARIO 34 ***
FT4312 SCENARIO 3 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED DESCENT UNTIL LEVEL)
TI>1E= 15 HNG= 2139.14185 SRNG= 2224.7o539 ALro= 614.761475
TIM£= **** 16 RNG= 2012.51123 SRNG= 2104.31274 ALro= 614.761475
TIMe= 17 RNG= 2028.6311C SHNG= 2119.73462 ALTlj= 614.761475
NOTE: RE'JUIRFD LEVEL OFF AT 2000 FEET.
FT4J12 SCENARIO 3 WITH COLLISICM AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TIMe= 15 RNG= 2138.14183 SHNG= 2276.44560 ALTO= 791.380959
TIM£= **** lb RNG= 2012.51123 SHNG= 2155.73413 ALTD= 772.050879
TI,Me= 17 RNG= 2023.6J110 SkNG= 2163.49219 ALTO= 766.168457
*** SCENARIO 35 ***
FT4312 SCENARIO 4 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)
SRNG= 3874.01636 ALTO= 956.029053
SfiNG= 3794.90576 ALTO= 914.366396
SRNG- 3794.22266 ALTD= 872.701172
OIDANCE MANEUVER
5KNG= 3932.41797 ALTD= 1170.42749
SRNG- 385«. 14648 ALTD= 1131.46265
SHNG= 3880.61230 ALTO= 1193.56008
**^ SCENARIO 36 ***
FT4422 SCENARIO 1 WITHOUT MANEUVtR (COfJTINUEO LdVEL)
TIME= 15 WNG= 5123.67187 SHNG= 5182.07422 ALTD= 742.058350
TIM£= ***« 16 RNG= 5130.41406 SRNG= 5177.90625 ALTO= 699.695068
TIME= 17 HNG= 5152.21094 SRNG= 5193.97266 ALTO= 657.339844
FT4422 SCENARIO 1 WITH COLLISION AVOIOANCc MANEUVER
TIM£= 14 RNG= 5167. 03516 SRNG= 5299.38281 ALTD= 1176.95679
T1ME= **** 15 RNG= 5128.67187 SRNG= 5266.12500 ALTD= 1195.32788
TIME = a RNG= 3754.19922
TIME = *«** 9 RNG= 3672.79761
TIM£ = 10 RNG= 3692.49487
FT4312 SCSNAR 10 4 WITH COLLISICN
TIME = a HNG= 3754.19922
TIME = **** 9 RNG= 3672.79761
TIMt = 10 RN6= 3692.49467
69
file: ffcSoLrS ReSULTS Al
TIMd= lb RNG= 51J0.41A06 SRNG = 5271 .46875 ALTO = 1211 .31250
*** SCENAHtO 37 »**
FT44 22 SCSNAW IG 2 l*ITHOUT MANEtVER ICONTINUeO DESCENT)
T IME= 15 RNG= 1032.64253 SHNG = 125
1
.84 130 ALTD = 707.351 318
Tl,\»t= **** lb HNG= 10J1.47S10 SkNG = 1220.653<?4 ALTO = 652. 739258
TIMe= 17 r(NG= 1358.36133 SHNG = 1484.67212 ALTO = 598. 120361
FT4422 SCEMAri 10 2 WITH CQLLISICM AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TlMe= 15 HNG= 1032.84253 SRNG = 1 48 5.07 03 1 AurD= 1067.08569
TiMe= **** 16 RNG= 1031. 475 10 SRNG = 1474. 10303 ALro = 1053. 11011
riMe= 17 RNG= 1358.86133 Sf<NG= 171 0. 6530fl ALTC = 1039. 1491
7
*** SCENARIO 38 ***
FT4422 SCENARIO J WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED LEVEL)













RNG= S18.89 I 1 13
RNG= 293. 148925
RNG= 328. 1093 7S
3 WITH CCLLISICN
RNG= 5 18.891 1 13
HNG= 293. 148926
25 HNG= 328. 10937^
SHNG = 729.418701 ALTD
SRNG= 588.921631 ALTO
SriNG = 605.5 11 230 ALTO
VOIOANCE MANEUVER
SHNG = 930. 103271 ALTO









*«* SCENARIO 39 ***
FT4422 SCENARIO 4 WITHOUT MANEUVER (CONTINUED DESCENT)
Trie= 25 RNG= 4856.33594 SRNG =
TIM£= **** 26 rJNG= 4323.996C9 SRNG=
TIME= 27 RNG= 4377.47656 SRNG=
FT4422 SCENARIO 4 alTH CCLLISICN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
TI'^«e= 2b HNG= 4S56. 33594 SHNG =
TIMt= «*** 2o RNG= 4823.99609 SRNG=













*** SCENARIO 40 ***
FT4422 SCENARIO 5 WITHOUT MANEUVER
Tl'*e= 25 HNG= 1400.62231










27 RNG= 1084.52563 SHNG= 1036.23340
WAS LEVELING AT 5000 F£ET AT RA TIME.
WITH CCLLISICN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
1400.62231 SRNG--
1017.89844 SRNG;


















SUMMARY OF RA MANEUVER DATA
file: pltt data ai
A B C 6 F G H
1 29 18 11 684.8 295. 3 389.5 327.6
2 34 20 14 lOOS .4 l«; I .5 883.9 648.8
3 25 5 20 1026.9 105 I .4 -24.5 -2.2




5 19 18 1 425.5 80.7 344.6 89.9
6 42 26 16 531. S 30.6 550.9 31 .0
7 27 14 13 1526 .0 703.4 824.6 176.2
8 51 36 IS 1215.2 3tl2.a 8 32.4 1 04.3
9 32 17 15 701 .6 18.
O
683.0 4 32 .1
10 66 30 36 776.6 93.4 8J.2 1 86.
5
1 1 30 17 13 140.4 645.8 -505.4 -22.0
12 35 14 21 693.4 46 3.9 2 29 .5 51 .5
13 42 27 15 955.1 99.6 855.5 435.4
14 46 28 18 661.4 169. 1 692.3 2 10.9
IS 39 26 13 1365.6 257.6 1608.0 316.0
16 52 35 17 14b4.2 130.7 1323.5 185.2
17 34 19 IS 186 0.2 408.4 1451 .3 1536.9
la 44 26 18 1105.7 57.6 1048. 1 197.2
19 45 29 16 770.5 44.9 725.6 172.6
20 36 21 15 at 6.8 56 2.5 254.3 224.0
21 41 2b 15 611.7 239.0 372.7 130.3
22 31 17 14 1359.1 11 74.8 184.3 61.1
23 33 IS 18 264.2 653.7 -389.5 -19.7
24 39 4 3S 55S.7 522.2 37.5 13.6
25 43 22 21 912.2 127.5 784.7 184.7
26 40 24 16 421 .4 374.4 47.0 2.8
27 41 35 6 1648.3 185.4 1463.4 158.5
28 57 41 16 1519.3 297. 7 122 1.6 1 88.0
29 86 70 16 1004.3 9o2.4 21 .9 1 3.6
30 34 18 16 45J.a 105.5 348.3 68.5
31 40 24 16 545.8 44.5 501 .3 38.0
32 42 26 16 653. 1 168.7 4 64.4 159.3
32 40 24 16 16 2.9 47.2 1555.7 143.4
34 43 16 27 772.7 614.7 ISti.O 51 .4
35 25 9 16 1 18 1 .5 914.4 267. 1 73.2
36 30 IS IS 1195.3 699.7 495.6 ea.2
37 20 16 4 1053.1 652.7 40U.4 253.4
38 44 24 20 822.4 510.3 311.6 284.^
39 41 26 IS 771 .6 235.3 536.3 55.6
40 40 25 IS 532.5 60.9 471 .6 129. 1
A = SCENAP 10 NUMQER
8 = TIME FROM TA TO CPA FOR TCAS * I RCRAFT
C = TIME FROM AA TC CPA FOR TCAS AIRCRAFT
= OIFFcRSNCe in TIME 3ET«EEhf TA AND HA
t = ALTI TUDE OIFFEHENCE BETWEEN THc 2 AIRCRAFT AT CPA WITH TCAS MANEUVER
F = ALT I TUOe DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THt 2 AIRCRAFT AT CPA WITH ND MANEUVER
Q = CIFFERENCE BETWEEN TCAS ANC NO- TCAS ALTITUDE SEPARATION AT CPA




0. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -6000 FPM to +2000 FPM
and/or green lights from +2000 FPM to
+3000 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Climb
NOTE: The first presentation in each set of 14 was this
example display. The following 13 were presented
in a random order.
1. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -6000 FPM to +2000 FPM
and/or green lights from +2000 FPM to
+3000 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Climb
2. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from-6000 FPM to +1500 FPM
and/or green lights from +1500 FPM to
+2500 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Climb
3. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -1500 FPM to +6000 FPM
and/or green lights from -2500 FPM to
-1500 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Descend
4. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -2000 FPM to +6000 FPM
and/or green lights from -3000 FPM to
-2000 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Descend
5. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: -1500 FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -6000 FPM to +1500 FPM
and/or green lights from +1500 FPM to
+2500 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Climb
6. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: +1500 FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -1500 FPM to +6000 FPM




7. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: -1500 fpm
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -6000 FPM to -200 FPM and
from +200 FPM to +6000 FPM and/or green
lights from -200 FPM to +200 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Climb
8. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: +1500 fpm
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -6000 FPM to -200 FPM and
from +200 FPM to +6000 FPM and/or green
lights from -200 FPM to +200 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Descend
9. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: +1000 FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -6000 FPM to +2000 FPM
and/or green lights from +2000 FPM to
+3000 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Climb
10. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: -1000 fpm
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -2000 FPM to +6000 FPM
and/or green lights from -3000 FPM to
-2000 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Descend
11. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: +2000 FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from +1000 FPM to +6000 FPM
and/or green lights from FPM to +1000
FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Descend
12. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: -2000 FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -6000 FPM to -1000 FPM
and/or green lights from -1000 FPM to
FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: Climb
13. THREE PREVENTATIVE RA DISPLAYS
13A. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: +2000 FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from -6000 FPM to FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: No action required
13B. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: -2000 FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from FPM to +6000 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: No action required
13C. IVSI VERTICAL SPEED: FPM
WARNING ARC: Red lights from +200 FPM to +6000 FPM
and from -200 FPM to -6000 FPM.
REQUIRED RESPONSE: No action required
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